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Abstract 
This paper is the first to measure utility in intertemporal choice and presents new and more 
robust evidence on the discounting of money outcomes. Our measurement method is parameter-
free in the sense that it requires no assumptions about utility or discounting. We found that 
intertemporal utility was concave for gains and convex for losses, consistent with a hypothesis 
put forward by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Utility in intertemporal choice was close to 
utility in decision under risk and uncertainty, suggesting that there may be one unifying concept 
of utility that applies to all of economics. The existence of one concept of utility is important for 
applied economics, because it largely reduces data requirements. Discount rates declined over 
time, but less so than has been observed in previous studies that assumed linear utility. Of the 
main discounted utility models, Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) generalized hyperbolic 
discounting model best fitted our data. The widely-used quasi-hyperbolic model fitted the data 
only slightly better than constant discounting. Finally, we obtained evidence of an asymmetry in 
discounting between gains and losses, which, in contrast with earlier findings, cannot be 
explained by a framing effect.  
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 Many economic decisions involve outcomes that occur at different points in time. To 
model such decisions, discounted utility models are typically used. These models combine a 
utility function that reflects attitudes towards outcomes and a discount function that captures the 
effect of the passage of time. The most widely used discounted utility model in economics is 
constant discounting in which the discount function is determined by a constant rate of discount. 
Empirical studies on time preference have observed that discount rates are not constant but 
decrease over time, a phenomenon referred to as decreasing impatience (Frederick et al. 2002, 
Read 2004). These findings have led to the development of alternative discounted utility models, 
commonly referred to as hyperbolic discounting. The hyperbolic discounting models are 
consistent with decreasing impatience and have become quickly popular in economics. Today 
many applications are based on hyperbolic discounting, in particular on quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting a model that was first proposed by Phelps and Polak (1968) and made popular by 
Laibson (1997).1  
 Empirical measurement of discounted utility models is complex, because it requires the 
simultaneous elicitation of the utility function and the discount function. Previous studies have 
side-stepped this problem and have assumed specific functional forms for the utility function and 
the discount function. In particular, most studies have assumed linear utility. A drawback of 
making parametric assumptions is that the quality of the estimation comes to depend on the 
choice of functional forms. For example, if utility is concave instead of linear then falsely 
                                                
1 Examples of applications based on quasi-hyperbolic discounting include Laibson (1997), Bernheim et al. (2001), 
Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell and Smith (2003), and Salanié and Treich (2006) for saving, O'Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999) and Brocas and Carrillo (2001) for procrastination, Brocas and Carrillo (2000) for the value of 
information, Gruber and Köszegi (2001) for addiction, Bénabou and Tirole (2002) for self-confidence, Diamond and 
Köszegi (2003) for retirement, and Karp (2005) for global warming. 
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assuming linear utility will lead to an overestimation of discount rates. It should be noted that 
most empirical studies have indeed found high discount rates. Another limitation of assuming 
functional forms for utility is that no or only limited information is obtained on the intertemporal 
utility function. Consequently, in spite of the importance of intertemporal preferences and 
discounted utility models in economics, there exists to date no study that has actually measured 
the utility function in intertemporal choice. 
 In light of the above problems, this paper presents a new method to measure both 
intertemporal utility and the discount function without making any assumptions about functional 
forms. It is in this sense that we refer to our method as parameter-free. An additional advantage 
of our method is that it allows measuring utility and discounting at the individual level and, 
therefore, takes account of heterogeneity in individual preferences. We applied out method in an 
experimental study and, hence, this paper is the first to measure intertemporal utility and to 
obtain robust estimates of the discount function and at the individual level.  
 Our data allowed us to address several empirical questions. First, we obtained evidence 
on the shape of the utility function in intertemporal choice. Classical economics assumes that this 
utility function is everywhere concave. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), by contrast, posit that 
people treat gains and losses differently and have concave utility for gains and convex utility for 
losses. We performed our experiment both for gains and for losses, which made it possible to 
compare the predictions of classical economics with Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) 
hypotheses.  
 Second, our findings on intertemporal utility allowed us to shed some empirical light on a 
long-standing issue in economics, whether there exists one unifying concept of utility that 
applies to all of economics or whether different concepts of utility apply in different decision 
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contexts (for a history see Wakker 1994). No empirical guidance exists on this debate, because 
few measurements of utility were available in decision contexts other than decision under risk. 
The existence of one unifying concept of utility would be highly desirable for applied economics 
because it implies that utility measurements can be transferred across decision contexts thereby 
greatly reducing data requirements. By comparing our utility measurements with those from the 
literature on decision under risk, we were able to provide insights regarding the existence of one 
unifying concept of utility.  
 Third, we could test whether the commonly observed pattern of declining discount rates 
persisted when the assumption of linear utility was relaxed. As argued above, there are grounds 
to suspect that previous observations of decreasing impatience may, at least partly, have been 
caused by falsely assuming linear utility. Our data also made it possible to compare the fit of 
constant discounting with that of its main hyperbolic alternative, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, 
and three other popular hyperbolic discounting models. Many studies have provided support for 
hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Ainslie 1975, Thaler 1981, Benzion et al. 1989, Kirby and 
Marakovic 1995),2 but little insight exists into which hyperbolic model most accurately describes 
intertemporal preferences. The popularity of quasi-hyperbolic discounting relative to other 
hyperbolic discounting models in economics is based on its theoretical tractability and not on its 
displayed descriptive superiority. 
 Finally, we could perform a robust test for an asymmetry between the discounting of 
gains and losses that has been observed in some earlier studies (Thaler 1981, Benzion et al. 
1989). One explanation for the gain-loss asymmetry may be that it is an artifact of the 
assumption of linear utility. When utility is concave for gains, leading to an overestimation of 
                                                
2 For findings challenging hyperbolic discounting see Read (2001) and Read et al. (2005). 
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discount rates for gains, and closer to linear for losses, leading to less distortion of discount rates 
for losses, then the gain-loss asymmetry will follow from the assumption of linear utility even 
when people have the same discount function for gains and for losses. The pattern “concave 
utility for gains and more linear utility for losses” has been observed in several empirical studies 
on decision under risk (Fishburn and Kochenberger 1979, Abdellaoui 2000, Pennings and Smidts 
2003).  
 In what follows, Section 2 reviews previous theoretical and empirical research on 
intertemporal choice. Section 3 presents our method for measuring discounted utility. The design 
and results of our experiment are specified in Sections 4 and 5 and are discussed in Section 6. 
We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Theory and Existing Empirical Evidence 
We consider temporal profiles (x0,….,xT), where xt denotes outcome x at time point t and 
time point 0 is the present. Outcomes can be money amounts but also binary prospects (p:M; m) 
denoting money amount M with probability p and money amount m with probability 1−p. 
Throughout we assume that 0, i.e. receiving nothing, belongs to the set of outcomes. 
We examine preferences í over temporal profiles. The relations Ç, Ä, ê, and ~ are as 
usual. Preferences over outcomes are derived from preferences over constant temporal profiles, 
where x1 = ….= xT = x. We say that α í β if and only if (α,….,α) í (β,…,β), i.e. receiving α at 
all points in time is preferred to receiving β at all points in time. 
We assume that the decision maker perceives outcomes relative to 0. Gains are outcomes 
preferred to 0 and losses are outcomes less preferred than 0. We will only consider temporal 
prospects where all outcomes have the same sign, i.e. either all outcomes are gains or all 
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outcomes are losses. A function V represents í when for all x,y, x í y if and only if V(x) ≥ 
V(y). Throughout, we will assume that preferences over temporal profiles can be represented by 
the general discounting model 
 
V(x0,….,xT) = ∑ Tt=0 λit u(xt), i = +,−      (1) 
 
with the time weights λit positive and λ i0 = 1 and u a real-valued utility function that represents 
preferences over outcomes. We allow that the time weights differ for gains and for losses. To 
keep the notation tractable, we will suppress the sign-dependence of the λit and simply write λt in 
what follows. Whether the time weights for gains or the time weights for losses apply will be 
apparent from the decision context.  
The time weights λt are unique and the utility function is unique up to unit. Equation (1) 
is general in the sense that it presumes nothing about the ordering or the relative magnitude of 
the λt. The main models of discounting are all special cases of (1). A preference foundation for 
general discounting has been given by Krantz et al. (1971, Theorem 6.15). 
 The best-known special case of (1) is constant discounting, which was introduced 
by Samuelson (1937) and which is still the most widely used discounted utility model in 
economics. Constant discounting entails that the time weights λt in (1) are equal to 1(1+δ)t , where 
δ is the constant discount rate. As mentioned before, experimental evidence has cast doubts on 
the descriptive validity of the constant discounting. In this paper we focus on two violations of 
constant discounting: decreasing impatience, the finding that discount rates are not constant but 
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decrease over time, and the gain-loss asymmetry, the finding that people discount gains and 
losses differently.3  
Many studies have observed decreasing impatience. See for example Thaler (1981), 
Benzion et al. (1989), Shelley (1993), and Kirby and Marakovic (1995) for money amounts and 
Chapman (1996), Lazaro et al. (2001), and van der Pol and Cairns (2002) for health. An 
exception is Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997), who only observed decreasing impatience in a 
matching task, but not in a choice task. The common assumption in these studies was linear 
intertemporal utility. Chapman (1996) also considered power utility. She elicited utility in an 
atemporal setting using introspective strength of preference judgements and then assumed that 
this function could also be applied to intertemporal choice.4 Whether utility is transferable across 
decision domains is highly controversial in economics. Arrow (1951), Savage (1954), Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), and Fishburn (1989) amongst others have argued against such transferability.  
There is some controversy in the literature as to whether decreasing impatience holds in 
general or whether violations of constant discounting occur only in the first time interval. The 
latter hypothesis is referred to as the immediacy effect and underlies quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, which will be discussed below. Some studies found support for the immediacy 
effect (Bleichrodt and Johannesson 2001, Frederick et al. 2002); others rejected it and also found 
violations of constant discounting for later time intervals (Kirby and Herrnstein 1995, Kirby 
1997, Lazaro et al. 2001). 
The gain-loss asymmetry is empirically less well-established than decreasing impatience. 
Thaler (1981) and Benzion et al. (1989) found evidence of the gain-loss asymmetry, but Shelley 
                                                
3 The gain-loss asymmetry can be accommodated within the general discounting model because we allow that the λt 
differ between gains and losses. 
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(1993) showed that their findings could be explained by a framing effect. In a neutral frame, she 
found no evidence of a gain-loss asymmetry, a finding that was later confirmed by Ahlbrecht and 
Weber (1997).  
 
2.1 Alternative discounting models 
 Several alternative discounting models have been proposed in response to the observed 
violations of constant discounting. These models were primarily designed to explain decreasing 
impatience. Except for the model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), they make no distinction 
between gains and losses and, hence, cannot explain the gain-loss asymmetry.  
 Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) suggested to use a generalized hyperbolic discounting 
model, in which λt = 1(1+γt)α/γ , with α,γ > 0. The parameter γ determines the departure from 
constant discounting. The limiting case of γ tending to zero yields constant discounting. Because 
α is positive, the discount rates implied by generalized hyperbolic discounting decrease over 
time, corresponding to decreasing impatience. Loewenstein and Prelec assumed that the time 
weights were the same for gains and for losses. To explain the gain-loss asymmetry, they 
suggested that the intertemporal utility function u in (1) is concave for gains and convex for 
losses and is more elastic for losses than for gains. The special case of generalized hyperbolic 
discounting in which α = γ was initially proposed by Herrnstein (1981) and is referred to as 
proportional or hyperbolic discounting. Power discounting (Harvey 1986), is the special case of 
generalized hyperbolic discounting in which γ = 1.  
                                                                                                                                                          
4 In a recent working paper Andersen et al. (2006) used a comparable strategy: they estimated power utility from 
decision under risk and then applied this function to intertemporal choice.  
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Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997), is the special case 
of (1) where λt = β(1+δ)t  for t > 0 with 0 < β ≤ 1. The only difference with constant discounting is 
the parameter β. Constant discounting is the special case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting with β 
= 1. If β < 1 then the outcome in the first period is discounted at a higher rate than the discount 
rate that is used to compare the outcomes in any two other contiguous future periods. In other 
words, β < 1 models the immediacy effect.  
 
 
3. Measurement Method 
 Our method to measure the general discounting model (1) consisted of two stages. In the 
first stage, choices between temporal profiles were constructed in such a manner that the time 
weights λt canceled, allowing us to measure utility without the need to know the time weights. 
This way of measuring utilities resembles the utility measurement method of Wakker and 
Deneffe (1996) for decision under uncertainty. The difficulty in translating their method to 
intertemporal choice is that the utility function in intertemporal choice has different uniqueness 
properties than the utility function in decision under uncertainty. In the second stage, we used the 
elicited utilities to measure the time weights. Hence, we could measure the time weights from the 
elicited utilities and no assumptions about the shape of utility had to be made. 
 Our method involves choosing the utility of two outcomes and, as is shown in Appendix 
A, this is only allowed when all temporal profiles involve the same unit of time and have 
common final periods. That is, for all profiles (x1,…,xT) and (y1,…,yS), the difference in timing 
between xt−1 and xt is equal to the difference in timing between yt−1 and yt and T = S. Hence, we 
 11
will assume such profiles in the remainder of this Section and we only used such profiles in our 
experimental study described in Section 4. 
 
First stage: measurement of utility 
 Let x0yt denote the temporal profile that gives x now, y at time point t and nothing in all 
other periods. The first step in the measurement of utility was to select two gauge outcomes G 
and g and a starting outcome x0. Superscripts serve to distinguish outcomes and do not denote 





t. In terms of the general discounting model (1) this indifference implies that 
 




 u(x1) − u(x0) = u(G)−u(g)λt  .        (3) 
 
 The outcome x1 was used as an input in the next question where we elicited x2 such that 
indifference held between g0 x
2
t and G0 x
1
t. By (1) and a similar argument as above, this 
indifference implied that  
 
u(x2) − u(x1) = u(G)−u(g)λt  .        (4) 
 
 Thus, u(x2) − u(x1) = u(x1) − u(x0). We proceeded to elicit indifferences g0 xjt ~ G0 xj−1t , j = 
3,…,k, and obtained a standard sequence of outcomes x0, x1,…., xk such that successive 
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elements of the sequence were equally spaced in terms of utility: u(xj+1) − u(xj) = u(x1) − u(x0) 
for j = 2,…,k−1. It is easily verified that if G ê g then the standard sequence is increasing, i.e. xj 
ê xj−1 for j = 1,….,k. If G Ä g then the standard sequence is decreasing, i.e. xj Ä xj−1 for j = 
1,….,k.  
 Appendix A shows that if all temporal profiles involve the same unit of time and have 
common final periods then we can freely choose the utility of two outcomes. Since we only 
considered such temporal profiles, we set u(xk) = 1 and u(x0) = 0 for increasing standard 
sequences, yielding u(xj) = j/k for j = 0,…,k. For decreasing standard sequences, we set u(xk) = 
−1 and u(x0) = 0, yielding u(xj) = −j/k for j = 0,…,k. 
 
Second stage: measurement of the time weights 
 Once the utility function is known, the measurement of the time weights is 
straightforward. We elicited the outcome z such that a participant was indifferent between z0x
0
t, 
i.e. z now and x0 at time point t, and x00 x
k
t, i.e. x
0 now and xk at time point t. By (1) we obtain that  
 
u(z) + λtu(x0) + ∑s≠0,t λsu(0) = u(x0) + λtu(xk) + ∑s≠0,t λsu(0)    (5) 
 
and, hence, by the adopted scaling, 6u(z)6 = λt. By varying t, we could elicit different time 
weights. The elicited outcomes z typically did not belong to the standard sequence elicited in the 
first stage and their utility was unknown. If participants have positive time preference, however, 
then z will lie between two elements of the elicited standard sequence and we could approximate 
the utility of z through the known utility of these elements of the standard sequence. This 
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approximation will be good if successive elements of the standard sequence are not too far apart. 
We return to the issue of approximation below.  
 
4. Experiment 
 The aim of the experiment was to elicit the intertemporal utility function and the time 
weights both for gains and for losses through the procedure outlined above. 
 
Participants and incentives 
Seventy participants were recruited and were paid a fixed amount of €12.50 to join the 
experiment. The participants were students from different faculties of the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam. Before the actual experiment, we tested the design in several pilot sessions using 
other students and university staff as participants. 
Throughout the experiment we used hypothetical choices. There were several reasons for 
using hypothetical instead of real incentives. A first reason was the problem in organizing 
payments in the future, some of which occurred in four years time. Second, because utility tends 
to be close to linear for small amounts (Wakker and Deneffe 1996), we used large money 
amounts to capture the effect of utility curvature. Paying these amounts for real would have been 
prohibitively expensive. Third, there were ethical constraints to use real incentives for the losses 
part of the experiment. Finally, in hypothetical questions one can ask participants to assume that 
there is no risk associated with future payments. With real stakes, participants may consider the 
receipt of future money amounts uncertain, which could inflate the discounting of these amounts.  
Some studies have investigated the differences between real and hypothetical money 
amounts in intertemporal decision making, but no clear evidence exists that hypothetical 
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amounts are discounted differently than real amounts (Frederick et al. 2002). In decision under 
uncertainty, real and hypothetical incentives do not seem to give qualitatively different results, 




 The experiment was executed with each participant individually using a computer 
program. Answers were entered into the computer by the interviewer, so that participants could 
concentrate on the questions and mistakes could be reduced. Each individual session lasted 
between 30 and 45 minutes. Throughout the experiment, participants were encouraged to think 
aloud to obtain insight into the reasoning underlying their answers. 
 All indifferences were elicited through a sequence of choices. We used choices because 
empirical evidence suggests that choice-indifferences lead to fewer inconsistencies than 
indifferences determined by matching, where participants are directly asked to state their 
indifference value (Bostic et al. 1990). Because we used choices, our study employs what 
Shelley (1993) refers to as a neutral frame and, hence, we could test whether the gain-loss 
asymmetry was due to a framing effect. 
 The interviewer used a scroll bar to vary the value of the outcome that we sought to elicit, 
starting with values for which preferences were clear and then “zooming in” on the indifference 
value. Examples of the computer screens that participants faced in the first and the second stage 
of the experiment are in the Appendix. 
 We elicited the general discounted utility model first for gains and then for losses. We 
always started with the gains part because we learnt from the pilot sessions that this made it 
 15
easier for participants to understand the choice task. Both parts were preceded by a practice 
question. Recall from Section 3 that our method involved the selection of two gauge outcomes 
denoted G and g. For gains (losses), G was a prospect giving a 50% chance of winning (losing)  
€2000 (and nothing otherwise) and g was a prospect giving a 50% chance of winning (losing) 
€500. Hence, we elicited increasing standard sequences for gains and decreasing standard 
sequences for losses. We used risky prospects instead of riskless money amounts to discourage 
heuristics like simply computing the difference in absolute values, which we observed in pilot 
studies where riskless money amounts were used. It is important to emphasize that our results are 
robust to participants’ evaluation of prospects (e.g. according to expected utility or prospect 
theory) provided that the same theory is used throughout the experiment. As mentioned before, 
we chose substantial amounts of money to be able to detect utility curvature. A few participants 
mentioned budgetary constraints in the losses questions. They were told to assume that an 
interest-free loan was available to pay off the losses. 
 The starting outcome x0 was €0 both for gains and for losses. The delay t was set equal to 
1 year in the elicitation of utility. Hence, in the first question we elicited the money amount x1 
that made participants indifferent between prospect G at time point 0 and nothing in 1 year and 
prospect g at time point 0 and x1 in 1 year. Both for gains and for losses we elicited 6 elements of 
the standard sequence.  
In the second part of the experiment, we elicited the time weights for t = 3 months, 6 
months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years, both for gains and for losses. The order in which 
the time weights were elicited was random. Both for gains and for losses, we tested for 
consistency by repeating the first elicitation at the end of each experimental task. That is, in the 
elicitation of utility, we repeated the elicitation of x1 after x1,…,x6 had been elicited and in the 
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elicitation of the time weights we repeated the elicitation of the time weight that had been 
elicited first5 after the time weights for 3 months,…, 4 years had been elicited. 
 
Analyses 
The results for means and medians were similar and, hence, we will only report the 
medians in the analysis of the aggregate data. Due to the presence of outliers, we focused on 
nonparametric tests to test for statistical significance.  
To investigate the curvature of utility at the individual level, we computed  
 
∂j = (xj+1 − xj) − (xj − xj−1), j = 1,…,5,         (6) 
 
i.e. how much successive outcome intervals increase or decrease. We observed ten values of ∂j 
for each participant, five for gains and five for losses. For gains, a positive value of ∂j 
corresponds to a concave part of the utility function. A positive ∂j means that an individual needs 
a larger increase in money to obtain a given increase in utility (1/6) at higher amounts than he 
needs at lower amounts. Likewise, a negative value of ∂j corresponds to a convex part of the 
utility function and a value of zero to linear utility. For losses, a positive value of ∂j corresponds 
to a convex part of the utility function and a negative value of ∂j to a concave part.  
Both for gains and for losses, we determined for all five ∂j’s of each participant whether it 
corresponded to a concave, convex or linear part of the utility function. We classified a 
participant as having linear (concave, convex) utility if he had at least three linear (concave, 
convex) parts. Again, we did this both for gains and for losses. We used a criterion of three 
                                                
5 Recall that the order in which the time weights were elicited was random. 
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instead of five similar parts, to account for response error.6 If none of the three parts (linear, 
concave or convex) occurred more than twice, the participant was left unclassified. 
To smoothen out irregularities in the data, we also analyzed the data under specific 
parametric assumptions about utility. We examined two parametric families: the power family 
and the exponential family. Both are widely used in economics and decision analysis. Because 
the two functions yielded similar results we will only report the results for the power family. Let 
z = x/x6, x∈[0,x6]. The power family is defined by 6z6r if r > 0, by ln(z) if r = 0, and by −6z6r if r < 
0. For gains (losses), r < 1 corresponds to concave (convex) utility and r > 1 to convex (concave) 
utility; the case r = 1 corresponds to linear utility both for gains and for losses. We estimated the 
parametric families both for the median data and for each individual separately. The estimation 
was by nonlinear least squares.  
We used the estimates of the power coefficients to obtain another, parametric, 
classification of individual participants. For gains (losses) we classified a participant as concave 
(convex) if his power coefficient was below 0.95, as linear if his power coefficient was between 
0.95 and 1.05, and as convex (concave) if his power coefficient exceeded 1.05.  
To compute the time weights we had to approximate the utility of the elicited outcome z 
in (5). We did this by linear approximation. We also used approximation by the estimated power 
and exponential utility. This affected the results only marginally and we do not report these 
results separately. 
From the elicited time weights we could estimate implied annual discount rates ρs as 
follows: 
 
                                                
6 Similar criteria were used by Fennema and van Assen (1999), Abdellaoui (2000), Etchart-Vincent (2004), and 
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λs = 1(1+ρs)s ,          (8) 
 
where s is time in years. We could then test whether the implied annual discount rates were 
constant. We computed the difference between the implied annual discount rates for adjacent 
time periods7 and, hence, obtained five observations for each participant both for gains and for 
losses. If at least three of these observations were positive then the participant was classified as 
decreasingly impatient, i.e. as having decreasing discount rates over time, if at least three 
observations were negative then he was classified as increasingly impatient, and if at least three 
observations were zero then he was classified as a constant discounter. Again, we used a 
criterion of three out of five to account for response error. 
We also used the elicited time weights to estimate the parameter(s) in constant 
discounting, generalized hyperbolic discounting, proportional discounting, power discounting, 
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Each model was estimated separately, so we did not assume 
that ρ in constant discounting and ρ in quasi-hyperbolic discounting were equal, that γ in 
generalized hyperbolic discounting and γ in proportional discounting were equal or that α in 
generalized hyperbolic discounting and α in power discounting were equal. The models were 
estimated by nonlinear least squares both for the median data and for each participant separately. 
To test whether the results were sensitive to the specification of the unit of time, we performed 
the estimations for different specifications of the unit of time (years, months, and weeks).  
Goodness of fit was assessed by Akaike’s information criterion. An important advantage 
of this criterion is that it takes into account that the discounting models differ in the number of 
                                                                                                                                                          
Abdellaoui et al. (2005). 
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parameters employed. The fit of nested models was also compared through likelihood ratio tests. 
Because the coefficients for the median data were very close to the medians of the estimated 
coefficients for the individual data, we will focus on the individual data.  
 
5. Results 
The data of two participants were excluded from the analysis, because these participants 
gave answers that did not correspond to their reasoning. The data of another participant were lost 
due to a computer crash. As a result, the data of 67 individuals (31 females) were included in the 
analysis. The consistency of the data was good: none of the tests that we performed revealed 
significant inconsistencies in participants’ responses (p > 0.05 in all tests). The individual 




Concavity of utility was most common at the individual level. Twenty-two participants 
were classified as concave, 16 as linear, and 7 as convex. The proportion of concave participants 
was significantly higher than the proportion of convex participants (p < 0.01). The classification 
based on the individual estimates of the power function also showed predominant concavity: 
thirty-eight individuals were classified as concave, 12 as linear and 17 as convex. The difference 
between the proportion of concave and the proportion of convex participants was significant (p < 
0.01). The median of the individual estimates of the coefficient in the power utility function was 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 That is, we computed ρ3months− ρ6months, ρ6months− ρ1year, ρ1year− ρ2years, ρ2years− ρ3years, and ρ3years− ρ4years. 
 20
0.91 (interquartile range (IQR) = 0.76−1.05), which indicated slight concavity. This median was, 
however, not significantly different from 1 (p = 0.075). 
 
Figure 1. The Utility Function for Gains Based on the Median Data 
 
Our findings on utility were comparable to those observed for decision under risk and 
uncertainty. The proportions of concave and convex participants were slightly lower and the 
proportion of linear subjects was slightly higher (Abdellaoui 2000, Abdellaoui et al. 2005). 
The median power coefficient that we observed was similar to studies that estimated the utility 
for gains in decision under risk and uncertainty. Abdellaoui et al. (2005) and Schunk and Betsch 
(2006), for example, also found a median estimate of 0.91 for decision under uncertainty, 
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whereas for decision under risk this estimate was 0.88 in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and 
0.89 in Abdellaoui (2000).  
The aggregate data also showed concavity for gains. Figure 1 displays the utility function 
for gains based on the median data. The x-axis shows the medians of the elicited elements of the 
standard sequences for gains, the y-axis their utility. The difference between successive elements 
of the standard sequence generally increased, consistent with concave utility. The hypothesis that 
the difference between successive elements of the standard sequence was constant, the case 
corresponding to linear utility, could be rejected (p < 0.01). The estimated power coefficient for 
the median data was 0.84 (White’s corrected standard error = 0.027), which differed significantly 
from 1 (p < 0.01), the case corresponding to linear utility. Figure 2 also shows the estimated 
power function. As the figure shows, the fit of the estimation was very good. 
 
Time Weights 
The individual level data showed clear evidence of decreasing impatience: 55 participants 
were classified as decreasingly impatient and only 12 as increasingly impatient. The difference 
between the proportion of decreasingly impatient participants and the proportion of increasingly 
impatient participants was significant (p < 0.01). 
Table 1 shows the median time weights for each delay, as well as the median annual 
discount rates that were implied by these weights. The median implied discount rates were low in 
comparison with the rates estimated in most previous studies. The median discount rates declined 
over time, which is consistent with decreasing impatience. The pattern of decreasing impatience 
was significant: the hypothesis that the implied annual discount rates were constant could be 
rejected (p < 0.01). 
 22
Table 1. Time Weights and Implied Annual Discount Rates for Gains. Interquartile Ranges 
in Parentheses. 






























Table 2 shows the medians of the estimated individual parameters for each of the five 
discounting models. Generalized hyperbolic discounting fitted the data best. The difference in 
goodness of fit between generalized hyperbolic discounting and the other models was always 
significant. The fit of the other four models was similar and no significant differences were 
observed. The results were not sensitive to the specification of the unit of time. 
 
Table 2. Medians of the Individual Parameter Estimates for the Discounting Models 
(Gains) 
 
The median value of γ+ in generalized hyperbolic discounting shows limited deviation 
from constant discounting. The individual estimates of γ+ varied substantially, however. The 
wide variation of γ+ was caused by poor convergence of the estimation algorithm for some 
participants. We could reject the hypotheses that γ+ was equal to 0, the case of constant 
discounting, or equal to 1, the case of power discounting, (p < 0.01 in both cases) and also the 
hypothesis that α+ = γ+, the case of proportional discounting (p < 0.01). The parameter β+ in 
Model Constant Proportional Power Generalized Hyperbolic Quasi-hyperbolic 


















quasi-hyperbolic discounting was close to 1, but significantly lower than 1 (p < 0.01), suggesting 
a small but significant immediacy effect. There were only 17 subjects for whom β+ was less than 
0.95, which illustrates that for most subjects the immediacy effect was small. Both δ+ in constant 
discounting and δ+ in quasi-hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.02) and α+ in power discounting and 
α+ in generalized hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.03) differed significantly.  
 











Figure 2: Median Time Weights for Gains 







 The estimation results based on the median data were largely similar. The main 
exception was that the immediacy effect was no longer significant. Figure 2 shows the fit of 
generalized hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting and constant discounting to the 
median data. The results of power discounting and proportional discounting were similar but are 
not displayed to keep the figure tractable. The figure shows that even though generalized 





The individual data showed no clear pattern in the direction of concave or convex utility. 
There were 122 concave parts in total, 98 linear parts, and 125 convex parts.  Twenty-two 
participants had convex utility for losses and 20 had concave utility (9 had linear utility, the 
others could not be classified). The proportion of participants with convex utility did not differ 
significantly from the proportion with concave utility (p > 0.10). The classification based on the 
estimates of the power coefficient showed more evidence of convex utility for losses: 30 
participants had convex utility, 23 linear utility, and 14 concave utility. The proportion of 
participants with convex utility was now significantly higher than the proportion with concave 
utility for losses (p = 0.01). The median of the individual estimates of the coefficient in the 
power utility function was 0.96 (interquartile range = 0.82-1.04), also indicating slight convexity 
for losses. This median was not significantly different from 1 (p = 0.085).  
Our findings on utility for losses were also similar to those obtained for decision under 
risk and under uncertainty. The proportion of convex participants was similar, the proportion of 
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concave participants was somewhat higher and the proportion of linear participants somewhat 
lower (Fennema and van Assen 1999, Abdellaoui 2000, Etchart-Vincent 2004, Abdellaoui et al. 
2005). Our median estimate for the power coefficient of 0.96 was close to the estimates of 0.88 
in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 0.84 in Fennema and van Assen (1999), 0.92 in Abdellaoui 
(2000), and 0.96 for small losses and 0.98 for large losses in Etchart-Vincent (2004). 
 
Figure 3. The Utility Function for Losses Based on the Median Data 
 
Figure 3 shows the utility for losses based on the median data. The x-axis shows the 
medians of the elements of the standard sequences. The differences between successive elements 
of the standard sequence were close and, hence, the utility for losses was close to linear at the 
aggregate level. We could reject, however, the null hypothesis that the differences between 
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successive elements of the standard sequence were all equal (p < 0.01) and, hence, the hypothesis 
of linear utility.  
The estimate of the power coefficient was 0.97 (White’s corrected standard error: 0.016), 
which indicated slight convexity and which was just significantly different from 1 (p = 0.05). 




As for gains, decreasing impatience was the most common pattern at the individual level: 
47 participants were decreasingly impatient, 18 increasingly impatient, and 2 participants were 
constant discounters. The proportion of decreasingly impatient participants was significantly 
higher than the proportion of increasingly impatient participants (p < 0.01). 
Table 3 shows the median time weights and the implied annual discount rates for each of 
the six delays. The discount rates declined over time, as predicted by decreasing impatience, but 
the decline was modest. The pattern of decreasing impatience was significant, however: the null 
hypothesis that the implied discount rates were all equal could be rejected (p < 0.01).  
 
Table 3. Time Weights and Implied Annual Discount Rates for Losses. Interquartile 
Ranges in Parentheses. 































Table 4 shows the estimation results for the five discounting models at the individual 
level.8 As for gains, generalized hyperbolic discounting provided the best fit. It fitted the data 
significantly better than the other models except that for power discounting the results are 
ambiguous. Based on Akaike’s information criterion generalized hyperbolic discounting did not 
fit significantly better than power discounting (p = 0.181). However, based on the likelihood 
ratio test we could reject the hypothesis that γ− was equal to 1 (p < 0.01). 
 Proportional discounting fitted significantly worse than all other theories (p < 0.01 in all 
cases). No significant differences in goodness of fit were observed between constant discounting, 
power discounting, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The conclusions about the relative 
performance of the different theories were not sensitive to the specification of the unit of time. 
 
Table 4. Individual Parameter Estimates for the Discounting Models (losses) 
Model Constant Proportional Power Generalized hyperbolic Quasi-hyperbolic 


















The estimate for γ− in generalized hyperbolic discounting indicated stronger deviations 
from constant discounting than we observed for gains. The estimates varied substantially across 
individuals, however. We could reject the hypotheses that γ− was equal to 0, 1 or to α−  (p < 0.01 
in all cases). The estimate for β− suggested a small but significant immediacy effect (p < 0.01). 
Only 15 subjects had a value of β− smaller than 0.95, indicating that for most subjects the 
immediacy effect was modest. The parameters ρ− under constant discounting and ρ− under quasi-
                                                
8 For three participants, it was not possible to estimate the models because they did not discount losses. 
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hyperbolic discounting differed significantly (p < 0.01); the parameters α− under power 
discounting and α− under generalized hyperbolic discounting did not differ significantly (p > 
0.10). 
 









Figure 4: Median Time Weights for Losses 





The estimation results based on the median data were largely similar. The main difference was 
that the immediacy effect was no longer significant and the estimate of γ− in generalized 
hyperbolic discounting indicated less deviation from constant discounting and was only 0.228. 
This estimate differed significantly from 0, however (p = 0.027). Figure 4 shows the fit to the 
median data of generalized hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and constant 
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discounting. Generalized hyperbolic  fitted the data best, but the figure shows that the fit of 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting and, to a lesser degree, constant discounting was also good. All 
parametric models fitted the data better for losses than for gains. 
 
5.3. Comparison of gains and losses 
In order to check whether there was a gain-loss asymmetry, we investigated the 
difference between the time weight for gains and the time weight for losses for each delay. As 
Tables 2 and 4 show, the time weights were higher for losses than for gains. The difference was 
significant for all delays (p = 0.02 for 3 months, p < 0.01 for 6 months, p = 0.03 for 1 year, p < 
0.01 for 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years). 
Mixed results obtained when we compared the parameters in the five discounting models 
for gains and for losses. Remember that none of the discounting models allows for a difference 
in these parameters. The estimates in constant discounting and power discounting differed 
significantly for gains and for losses (p < 0.01). The parameters in generalized hyperbolic 
discounting and proportional discounting did not differ significantly for gains and for losses (p > 
0.10 in all tests). In the quasi-hyperbolic model, finally, the estimates of ρ+ and ρ− differed 
significantly (p < 0.01), whereas β+ and β− did not differ significantly (p > 0.10).  
 
5.4. The effect on the time weights of assuming linear utility  
As mentioned before, most previous studies that estimated discount rates assumed linear 
utility. To assess the bias resulting from assuming linear utility, we also computed the time 
weights under the assumption that utility was linear and compared these with the parameter-free 
time weights obtained without making assumptions about utility. The median time weights were 
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lower under linear utility and, hence, the annual discount rates were higher. However, the time 
weights under linear utility did not differ significantly from the parameter-free time weights (p > 
0.05) with the exception of the time weight for 2 years for gains (p = 0.05). The gain-loss 
asymmetry became more pronounced when linear utility was assumed (p = 0.01 for 3 months, p 
= 0.02 for 6 months, p < 0.01 for the other delays). 
The fit of the discounting models was significantly better when we used the utility-
adjusted time weights than when we used the time weights that were computed under the 
assumption that utility was linear. For gains, the exception was proportional discounting (p = 
0.056), for losses the exceptions were power discounting (p =0.063) and generalized hyperbolic 
discounting (p = 0.563). The conclusions about the relative fit of the discounting models were 
hardly affected by assuming linear utility. The only differences were that for losses generalized 
hyperbolic discounting now fitted significantly better than all other models and that proportional 
discounting no longer fitted significantly worse than constant discounting, quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, and power discounting. 
 
6. Discussion 
 Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), extending Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to 
intertemporal choice, suggested that utility be concave for gains and convex for losses. We found 
some evidence for their proposition. Our data were consistent with concave utility for gains, but 
for losses the picture was less clear, although the predominant shape of utility was slightly 
convex. The power coefficients that we estimated were consistent with Loewenstein and Prelec’s 
(1992) assumption that utility is more elastic for losses than for gains.  
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Interestingly, our findings on the degree of utility curvature were close to those obtained 
in decision under uncertainty and in decision under risk. This held both for gains and for losses. 
While requiring further evidence, this finding may suggest that there exists one unifying concept 
of utility. Economists have traditionally argued that utility differs across domains and, hence, 
that the utility function that is relevant for decision under risk cannot be employed in other 
contexts, such as intertemporal decision making. In applied economics transferability of utility 
is, however, commonly assumed. For example, in health economics measurements of utility 
under risk are routinely used in welfare comparisons. Our findings provide some tentative 
support for the transferability of utility that is commonly assumed in applied economics. 
 The discount rates we observed were lower than the rates observed in most previous 
studies (Frederick et al. 2002). This could not be entirely explained by the fact that, contrary to 
previous studies, we made no assumptions about utility, because even when linear utility was 
imposed the observed discount rates were still relatively low. One explanation may be that our 
experiment was choice-based, whereas most previous studies used matching tasks. It is well-
known that choice tasks tend to produce different results than matching tasks (Tversky et al. 
1988). Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) also observed different discounting patterns in choice than in 
matching. That said, even though our experimental tasks involved choices, it was clear to 
participants that we were looking for indifferences and in that sense our task resembled matching 
(Fischer et al. 1999). Empirical evidence shows that eliciting indifferences through a series of 
choices, as we did, produces results in between choice and matching (Delquié 1997). 
 Of the main discounting models that we considered, generalized hyperbolic discounting 
fitted the data best. The fit of constant discounting was rather good and we could not conclude 
that quasi-hyperbolic discounting, power discounting or proportional discounting fitted the data 
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unambiguously better than constant discounting. One reason why quasi-hyperbolic discounting is 
used so much in applications is the alleged belief that it fits individual choice behavior better 
than constant discounting. Our data provide little support for this belief. If the aim of models is 
to accurately describe individual intertemporal choice behavior then the most appropriate model 
to use seems generalized hyperbolic discounting. Estimation of the generalized hyperbolic model 
is no more complicated than quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the fit was significantly better. It 
should be emphasized, however, that there exist other reasons to use quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting besides descriptive accuracy, one of which is the greater tractability of the model in 
theoretical analyses. A cause of concern in our study is the instability of the estimates for the 
parameter γ in generalized hyperbolic discounting.  
 Our experiment used a neutral frame as did Shelley (1993) and Ahlbrecht and Weber 
(1997). Contrary to those studies, we observed evidence for a gain-loss asymmetry and, hence, 
our data do not corroborate the conclusion that the gain-loss asymmetry is caused by a framing 
effect. The difference between our findings and those of Shelley (1993) and Ahlbrecht and 
Weber (1997) cannot be explained by the assumption of linear utility made in these studies, 
because assuming linear utility actually increased the gain-loss asymmetry.  
 The finding that assuming linear utility seemed not to cause serious biases is important 
for empirical research into intertemporal preferences. As mentioned before, most studies have 
hitherto assumed linear utility but it was not known to what extent this assumption distorted their 
findings. Our results suggest that this distortion was modest. This finding was not caused by our 
method for measuring utility. An easy heuristic to adopt in responding to the utility elicitation 
questions might be by keeping the difference between successive elements of the standard 
sequence constant, which would lead to linear utility. However, both for losses and for gains 
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there were only six participants for whom the difference between successive elements of the 
standard sequence was always constant; there were only three participants for whom the 
difference between successive elements of the standard sequence was constant both for gains and 
for losses. These limited numbers suggest that the heuristic may not have caused serious biases. 
 Our method used chained measurements, i.e. answers from previous questions were used 
as inputs in later stages. A possible danger of using chained measurements is error propagation: 
errors in earlier responses get transferred to later responses. Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) and 
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) examined the effect of error propagation in their studies and concluded 
that it had little impact. Since our method was based on a similar chaining process as theirs, their 
findings suggest that the effect of error propagation was limited in our study as well. 
 A crucial assumption in our method was that participants behaved according to the 
general discounting model (1). This model underlies all of the main discounting models used in 
the literature. A central property of (1) is intertemporal additivity. There is some evidence of 
violations of intertemporal additivity (Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991, Frank and Hutchens 
1993). It is not clear how important these violations of (1) are. As mentioned by Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1992), they seem particularly relevant when evaluating complete alternative 
sequences of outcomes like savings plans or multiyear salary contracts. In our experiment, we 
considered, however, elementary types of intertemporal choices. We tried to mitigate the 
possible effect of violations of intertemporal additivity by using prospects in the elicitation of 
utility. We learned from pilot tests that using prospects made it more likely that people viewed 
things that happened at different points as separate and, hence, behaved more in line with 
intertemporal additivity. 
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 The order of the tasks was fixed throughout the experiment. We always started with the 
gains part, because, as we observed in the pilot sessions, participants found this easier. It may be, 
although we do not consider this likely, that participants became more aware of their true 
preferences during the experiment and that this has caused the gain-loss asymmetry in our study. 
By the construction of our elicitation method, we always had to elicit utility prior to the 
elicitation of the time weights. We cannot think of any systematic bias that may have arisen 
because of this. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a parameter-free method to measure the discounted utility model in 
its entirety. Hence, we are the first to measure the utility function in intertemporal choice and we 
provide more robust evidence on the discounting of monetary outcomes. We found concave 
utility for gains and slightly convex utility for losses, which supports a hypothesis put forward by 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Utility in intertemporal choice was close to previously found 
results on utility in decision under risk and uncertainty suggesting the existence of one unifying 
concept of utility. Our data confirmed decreasing impatience. The decrease was, however, 
modest and the fit of constant discounting was rather good. Of the hyperbolic discounting 
models that we examined, generalized hyperbolic discounting fitted the data best. Our data were 
less supportive of the widely-used quasi hyperbolic discounting model: it did not fit significantly 
better than constant discounting and the immediacy effect that we observed was small. We found 
some evidence for a gain-loss asymmetry in the time weights, which contradicts earlier 
conclusions that the gain-loss asymmetry was due to a framing effect (Shelley 1993, Ahlbrecht 
and Weber 1997) and also contradicts Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) who suggested that the 
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gain-loss asymmetry was a consequence of the shape of the utility function only. Finally, the 
assumption of linear utility seemed not to bias the estimated time weights and discount rates in a 
significant manner. Hence, our study suggests that assuming linear utility in future empirical 
studies and in practical applications may not be very harmful at least for qualitative purposes. 
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A. Proof that We Can Freely Choose the Utility of Two Outcomes When the Unit of Time 
and the Final Period Are the Same Across Temporal Profiles.  
 
 Because the unit of time and the final period are the same across temporal profiles, we 
restrict comparison to profiles x and y where the difference in timing between xt−1 and xt is equal 
to the difference in timing between yt−1 and yt and also the final periods are the same. Suppose 
that ∑ Tt=1λt u(xt) ≥ ∑ Tt=1λt u(yt) and that ∑ Tt=1λt u(.) represents í over temporal profiles. If we 
replace u by v = αu + β with α > 0 and β real, we obtain α∑ Tt=1λt u(xt) + β∑ Tt=1λt = α∑ Tt=1λt u(xt) + 
β∑ Tt=1λt ≥ α∑ Tt=1λt u(yt) + β∑ Tt=1λt = ∑ Tt=1λt v(yt). Hence, v also represents í. Note that the 
assumption that the unit of time and the final period are the same across the profiles was crucial 















Appendix D: Individual Parameter Estimates 




















1 0.055 0.058 0.111 -0.101 0.044 0.060 1.012 0.838 
2 0.062 0.067 0.129 0.298 0.086 0.063 1.002 0.626 
3 0.036 0.038 0.081 2.554 0.130 0.025 0.971 0.914 
4 0.051 0.054 0.106 -0.065 0.044 0.047 0.989 0.920 
5 0.013 0.013 0.028 -0.106 0.011 0.013 0.999 1.000 
6 0.003 0.003 0.007 25.629 0.057 0.001 0.995 0.488 
7 0.092 0.101 0.186 0.387 0.132 0.077 0.966 0.826 
8 0.084 0.092 0.172 0.427 0.126 0.076 0.982 0.669 
9 0.159 0.193 0.319 5.793 0.818 0.091 0.864 0.967 
10 0.667 0.816 0.889 0.440 0.698 0.789 1.077 3.299 
11 0.021 0.022 0.046 2.464 0.073 0.015 0.984 0.704 
12 0.147 0.167 0.282 -0.083 0.118 0.138 0.983 1.267 
13 0.196 0.227 0.357 -0.091 0.153 0.216 1.039 1.041 
14 0.037 0.038 0.078 1.279 0.087 0.028 0.977 0.779 
15 0.276 0.329 0.477 -0.131 0.193 0.322 1.076 1.143 
16 0.308 0.407 0.547 3.184 0.960 0.187 0.817 2.388 
17 0.010 0.011 0.023 3.627 0.046 0.007 0.991 0.799 
18 0.037 0.039 0.079 0.207 0.048 0.035 0.995 0.948 
19 0.008 0.008 0.017 -0.248 0.002 0.008 0.998 0.939 
20 0.033 0.034 0.072 4.306 0.158 0.020 0.967 1.000 
21 0.079 0.085 0.159 -0.070 0.067 0.078 0.997 0.688 
22 0.025 0.025 0.054 1.479 0.064 0.019 0.986 0.808 
23 0.174 0.203 0.329 0.017 0.165 0.173 0.998 1.000 
24 0.443 0.584 0.704 0.662 0.607 0.323 0.858 0.943 
25 0.138 0.159 0.272 0.450 0.203 0.110 0.941 0.759 
26 0.038 0.040 0.079 0.106 0.043 0.036 0.995 0.689 
27 0.040 0.042 0.085 1.541 0.104 0.031 0.977 1.592 
28 0.726 1.148 1.003 61.840 12.300 0.197 0.577 1.011 
29 0.223 0.267 0.410 -0.234 0.099 0.205 0.967 1.507 
30 0.433 0.555 0.692 0.007 0.363 0.357 0.905 0.976 
31 0.110 0.123 0.218 0.107 0.120 0.105 0.989 0.731 
32 0.083 0.091 0.167 0.114 0.094 0.091 1.018 1.067 
33 1.139 1.304 1.249 -0.024 0.746 1.296 1.064 2.525 
34 0.027 0.027 0.058 2.959 0.100 0.018 0.978 0.883 
35 0.250 0.292 0.437 -0.181 0.153 0.291 1.072 1.000 
36 1295.3 20.525 7.697 50.388 36.460 2.077 0.201 3.277 
37 0.324 0.368 0.530 -0.233 0.164 0.434 1.180 1.112 
38 1.472 1.503 1.324 1.074 1.354 1.225 0.939 5.905 
39 0.203 0.230 0.368 -0.247 0.075 0.197 0.988 0.820 
40 0.376 0.440 0.595 -0.114 0.270 0.515 1.181 0.885 
41 0.028 0.029 0.066 95160.1 602.89 0.001 0.931 0.786 
42 0.112 0.129 0.229 1.243 0.252 0.088 0.946 1.075 
43 0.578 0.761 0.843 0.583 0.703 0.458 0.890 0.730 
44 0.151 0.174 0.289 0.057 0.152 0.162 1.022 1.451 
45 0.102 0.117 0.213 3.515 0.407 0.066 0.918 1.018 
46 0.125 0.138 0.238 -0.178 0.079 0.143 1.040 0.772 
47 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.119 0.012 0.009 0.996 0.755 
48 0.029 0.029 0.059 -0.031 0.027 0.032 1.008 0.694 
 43
49 0.040 0.042 0.085 0.561 0.068 0.034 0.984 0.824 
50 0.167 0.194 0.315 0.044 0.165 0.172 1.010 0.780 
51 0.357 0.418 0.578 -0.215 0.194 0.456 1.144 1.054 
52 0.027 0.028 0.059 3.778 0.118 0.018 0.975 0.668 
53 0.193 0.252 0.388 17.477 2.097 0.074 0.784 1.045 
54 0.586 0.729 0.839 0.038 0.481 0.604 1.016 2.065 
55 0.033 0.034 0.067 -0.140 0.024 0.035 1.005 1.000 
56 0.049 0.052 0.104 0.551 0.083 0.040 0.976 0.594 
57 0.041 0.042 0.081 -0.222 0.020 0.048 1.019 0.755 
58 0.054 0.057 0.112 0.070 0.058 0.051 0.993 1.000 
59 0.069 0.076 0.151 27.768 1.200 0.027 0.900 0.641 
60 0.404 0.554 0.672 1.610 0.824 0.285 0.852 1.151 
61 0.327 0.377 0.541 -0.247 0.141 0.413 1.141 0.729 
62 0.165 0.192 0.315 -0.145 0.114 0.157 0.982 0.855 
63 0.194 0.226 0.358 -0.098 0.149 0.205 1.021 2.969 
64 0.076 0.083 0.156 0.292 0.103 0.070 0.986 0.732 
65 0.072 0.079 0.154 2.294 0.231 0.050 0.948 0.774 
66 0.030 0.031 0.064 0.548 0.051 0.026 0.991 0.845 
67 0.331 0.447 0.576 2.375 0.859 0.211 0.833 0.736 
 Note: CD = constant discounting, PowD = power discounting, GHD = generalized hyperbolic discounting, 

























1 0.072 0.115 0.153 2.102 0.219 0.052 0.950 1.027 
2 0.026 0.038 0.059 3.331 0.110 0.018 0.976 0.732 
3 0.018 0.027 0.038 -0.042 0.017 0.018 1.001 0.896 
4 0.017 0.025 0.035 -0.230 0.008 0.017 0.999 0.799 
5 0.017 0.025 0.037 0.730 0.033 0.015 0.993 0.911 
6        0.792 
7 0.084 0.138 0.173 0.367 0.121 0.074 0.974 0.971 
8 0.009 0.014 0.021 2.329 0.032 0.007 0.993 0.810 
9 0.045 0.069 0.094 0.263 0.060 0.040 0.989 0.634 
10 0.061 0.093 0.135 3.694 0.267 0.037 0.943 1.157 
11 0.014 0.020 0.033 25.542 0.247 0.006 0.978 0.897 
12 0.100 0.168 0.197 -0.191 0.059 0.101 1.002 1.088 
13 0.255 0.533 0.465 1.034 0.472 0.209 0.925 0.734 
14 0.032 0.048 0.070 2.200 0.103 0.024 0.978 0.782 
15        0.914 
16 0.541 1.158 0.803 1.547 0.960 0.332 0.799 5.151 
17 0.134 0.228 0.262 28.930 2.063 0.086 0.892 1.200 
18 0.046 0.071 0.095 0.115 0.053 0.047 1.003 1.010 
19 0.069 0.109 0.143 0.512 0.111 0.065 0.990 0.977 
20 0.132 0.234 0.257 -0.002 0.124 0.128 0.990 1.415 
21 0.089 0.145 0.184 1.208 0.200 0.067 0.949 1.023 
22 0.037 0.056 0.079 0.751 0.070 0.031 0.985 0.805 
23 0.132 0.231 0.252 -0.179 0.082 0.145 1.029 1.000 
24 0.341 0.785 0.589 1.080 0.608 0.269 0.900 0.901 
25 829.49 20.916 7.303 1162.94 382.88 0.330 0.150 1.759 
 44
26 0.037 0.057 0.076 -0.066 0.032 0.040 1.007 1.008 
27 0.042 0.064 0.086 -0.046 0.038 0.042 1.002 1.285 
28 0.371 0.794 0.610 -0.104 0.267 0.377 1.009 1.252 
29 0.055 0.084 0.120 8.358 0.401 0.030 0.939 1.027 
30 0.424 0.974 0.689 0.958 0.678 0.321 0.876 1.000 
31 0.018 0.026 0.040 1.051 0.040 0.015 0.992 0.964 
32 1.100 2.339 1.209 1.004 1.211 0.690 0.810 2.393 
33 0.072 0.117 0.145 -0.074 0.061 0.075 1.006 1.355 
34 0.085 0.139 0.173 0.306 0.116 0.085 0.999 1.047 
35 0.061 0.098 0.126 0.070 0.066 0.064 1.005 1.000 
36 0.015 0.020 0.034 6.819 0.100 0.008 0.981 0.735 
37 0.068 0.106 0.139 0.256 0.089 0.070 1.005 0.586 
38 0.037 0.056 0.076 -0.158 0.025 0.038 1.003 0.543 
39 0.049 0.075 0.108 2.531 0.171 0.035 0.963 1.045 
40 0.165 0.299 0.297 -0.233 0.078 0.223 1.123 0.653 
41 0.013 0.019 0.028 -0.216 0.007 0.008 0.987 1.160 
42 0.036 0.056 0.073 -0.174 0.023 0.038 1.006 0.930 
43 0.038 0.059 0.077 -0.209 0.021 0.043 1.013 1.075 
44        0.987 
45 0.098 0.162 0.208 6.844 0.601 0.053 0.899 1.007 
46 0.041 0.061 0.087 0.690 0.075 0.034 0.984 0.765 
47 0.014 0.021 0.031 0.988 0.031 0.012 0.993 0.715 
48 0.022 0.031 0.047 1.526 0.057 0.016 0.984 0.901 
49 0.056 0.089 0.116 0.146 0.066 0.055 0.996 0.847 
50 0.168 0.311 0.317 0.063 0.169 0.173 1.010 1.047 
51 0.358 0.753 0.586 -0.132 0.246 0.411 1.074 0.952 
52 0.052 0.080 0.112 1.317 0.126 0.041 0.971 0.893 
53 0.101 0.170 0.208 1.483 0.249 0.077 0.945 0.780 
54 0.203 0.380 0.373 -0.235 0.089 0.204 1.002 1.000 
55 0.048 0.074 0.099 -0.022 0.045 0.044 0.991 1.000 
56 0.073 0.120 0.146 -0.241 0.029 0.077 1.008 0.962 
57 0.022 0.032 0.046 -0.102 0.017 0.018 0.990 0.961 
58 0.059 0.093 0.120 -0.048 0.052 0.060 1.003 1.000 
59 0.211 0.403 0.391 -0.099 0.160 0.180 0.942 1.276 
60 0.083 0.134 0.168 0.142 0.096 0.073 0.978 1.633 
61 0.272 0.521 0.459 -0.245 0.118 0.364 1.165 0.669 
62 0.059 0.091 0.128 3.398 0.242 0.039 0.950 0.876 
63 0.027 0.039 0.060 4.674 0.139 0.016 0.972 0.654 
64 0.041 0.063 0.087 0.599 0.071 0.034 0.983 0.937 
65 0.014 0.020 0.032 54.506 0.431 0.006 0.977 0.822 
66 0.022 0.033 0.047 -0.090 0.019 0.022 1.000 0.986 
67 0.043 0.064 0.092 1.555 0.113 0.033 0.974 0.938 
Note: CD = constant discounting, PowD = power discounting, GHD = generalized hyperbolic discounting, 
QHD = quasi-hyperbolic discounting, PD = proportional discounting, PowU = power utility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
